A Theologico Political Treatise [Part IV]
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Benedict de Spinoza >> A Theologico Political Treatise [Part IV]
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Part 1 - Chapters I to V - 1spnt10.txt
Part 2 - Chapters VI to X - 2spnt10.txt
Part 3 - Chapters XI to XV - 3spnt10.txt
Part 4 - Chapters XVI to XX - 4spnt10.txt
Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer.
A Theologico-Political Treatise
Part IV of IV - Chapters XVI to XX
by Baruch Spinoza
TABLE OF CONTENTS: Search strings are shown thus [16:x].
Search forward and back with the same string.
[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - Of the Foundations of a State;
of the Natural and Civil Rights of Individuals;
and of the Rights of the Sovereign Power.
[16:1] In Nature right co-extensive with power.
[16:2] This principle applies to mankind in the state of Nature.
[16:3] How a transition from this state to a civil state is possible.
[16:4] Subjects not slaves.
[16:5] Definition of private civil right - and wrong.
[16:6] Of alliance.
[16:7] Of treason.
[16:8] In what sense sovereigns are bound by Divine law.
[16:9] Civil government not inconsistent with religion.
[17:0] CHAPTER XVII.- It is shown, that no one can or need
transfer all his Rights to the Sovereign Power. Of the
Hebrew Republic, as it was during the lifetime of Moses,
and after his death till the foundation of the Monarchy;
and of its Excellence. Lastly, of the Causes why the
Theocratic Republic fell, and why it could hardly have
continued without Dissension.
[17:1] The absolute theory, of Sovereignty ideal - No one can
in fact transfer all his rights to the Sovereign power.
Evidence of this.
[17:2] The greatest danger in all States from within,
not without.
[17:3] Original independence of the Jews after the Exodus.
[17:4] Changed first to a pure democratic Theocracy.
[17:5] Then to subjection to Moses.
[17:6] Then to a Theocracy with the power divided
between the high priest and the captains.
[17:7] The tribes confederate states.
[17:8] Restraints on the civil power.
[17:9] Restraints on the people.
[17:A] Causes of decay involved in the constitution
of the Levitical priesthood.
[18:0] CHAPTER XVIII.- From the Commonwealth of the Hebrews and
their History certain Lessons are deduced.
[18:1] The Hebrew constitution no longer possible or desirable,
yet lessons may be derived from its history.
[18:2] As the danger of entrusting any authority in politics
to ecclesiastics - the danger of identifying
religion with dogma.
[18:3] The necessity of keeping all judicial power with
the sovereign - the danger of changes in the
form of a State.
[18:4] This last danger illustrated from the history of
England - of Rome.
[18:5] And of Holland.
[19:0] CHAPTER XIX - It is shown that the Right
over Matters Spiritual lies wholly with the
Sovereign, and that the Outward Forms of
Religion should be in accordance with Public
Peace, if we would worship God aright.
[19:1] Difference between external and inward religion.
[19:2] Positive law established only by agreement.
[19:3] Piety furthered by peace and obedience.
[19:4] Position of the Apostles exceptional.
[19:5] Why Christian States, unlike the Hebrew,
suffer from disputes between the civil
and ecclesiastical powers.
[19:6] Absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers.
[20:0] CHAPTER XX - That in a Free State every man
may Think what he Likes, and Say what he Thinks.
[20:1] The mind not subject to State authority.
[20:2] Therefore in general language should not be.
[20:3] A man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse opinion
to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in
accordance with the law, deserves well of the State.
[20:4] That liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from
the history of Amsterdam.
[20:5] Danger to the State of withholding it. -
Submission of the Author to the
judgment of his country's rulers.
[Author's Endnotes] to the Treatise.
[16:0] CHAPTER XVI - OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE; OF THE
NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND OF THE
RIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER.
(1) Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology, and to
show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to both. (2) It is
now time to determine the limits to which such freedom of thought and
discussion may extend itself in the ideal state. (3) For the due
consideration of this question we must examine the foundations of a State,
first turning our attention to the natural rights of individuals, and
afterwards to religion and the state as a whole.
(16:4) By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those natural
laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by nature, so
as to live and act in a given way. (5) For instance, fishes are naturally
conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; therefore
fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural
right. [16:1] (6) For it is certain that nature, taken in the abstract, has
sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other words, her right is co-
extensive with her power. (7) The power of nature is the power of God, which
has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature
is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it
follows that every, individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in
other words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his
power as it has been conditioned. (8) Now it is the sovereign law and right
of nature that each individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is,
without regard to anything but itself ; therefore this sovereign law and
right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according
to its natural conditions. (9) We do not here acknowledge any
difference between mankind and other individual natural entities, nor
between men endowed with reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor
between fools, madmen, and sane men. (10) Whatsoever an individual does by
the laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it
acts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise. [16:2] (11)
Wherefore among men, so long as they are considered as living under the sway
of nature, he who does not yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the
habit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of his desire with as
sovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason.
(16:12) That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason
dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the ignorant
and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to
live according to the laws of desire. (13) This is identical with the
teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the law - that is, so
long as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature, there is
no sin.
(16:14) The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by
sound reason, but by desire and power. (15) All are not naturally
conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on
the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the
right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their
life, even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. (16)
Nevertheless, they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve
themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. (17) Nature
has given them no other guide, and has denied them the present power of
living according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by
the dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live by the laws
of the nature of a lion.
(16:18) Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway
of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or
impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take
for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any
other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who hinders
the accomplishment of his purpose.
(16:19) It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of
nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, only
prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it does not
forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of
the means suggested by desire.
(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the laws of
human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation; her
limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order of
nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of this alone
that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular
way. (21) If anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd,
or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely
ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also
because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our
human reason; in reality that which reason considers evil, is not evil in
respect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to
the laws of our reason.
(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live
according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, they
have men's true good for their object. (23) Moreover, everyone wishes to
live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would be
quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and reason's
claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger; there is no one
who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit,
and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. [16:3] (24) When we
reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live
most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that
men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and
well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally
belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned
by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the
whole body. (25) This end they will be unable to attain if desire be
their only guide (for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different
direction); they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they
will be guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to
repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any
desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as
they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's rights as
their own.
(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and
established, we will now inquire.
(27) Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects
anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a
greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure an
evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater
good. (28) That is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks
the greatest; and, of two evils, that which he thinks the least. (29) I say
advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not
necessarily follow that he judges right. (30) This law is so deeply
implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal truths
and axioms.
(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one
can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things
[Endnote 26], and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under
the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. (32) An example
will make the matter clearer. (33) Suppose that a robber forces me to
promise that I will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. (34) It is
plain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with
my power) that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by
assenting to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend
to accept his conditions. (35) Or again, suppose I have genuinely promised
someone that for the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any
nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be
kept without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and
right to choose the least of two evils, I have complete right to break my
compact, and act as if my promise had never been uttered. (36) I say that I
should have perfect natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true
and evident reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in thinking I
had promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or false, I should be in
fear of a greater evil, which, by the ordinance of nature, I should strive
to avoid by every means in my power.
(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its
utility, without which it becomes null and void. (38) It is, therefore,
foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we also
endeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for
the violator more harm than good. (39) This consideration should have very
great weight in forming a state. (40) However, if all men could be easily
led by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a
state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for everyone
would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the chief
good, namely, the shield and buckler of the commonwealth. (41) However, it
is far from being the case that all men can always be easily led by reason
alone; everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition,
envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that, reason has no place
therein. (42) Hence, though men make - promises with all the appearances of
good faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one can
absolutely rely on another man's promise unless there is something behind
it. (43) Everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully. and to break his
compacts, unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the
fear of some greater evil.
(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual
is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either
willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he in
so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that the
Sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power,
wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the
universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will
retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will;
otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he
will be bound unwillingly to obey him.
(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of
natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if
each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the
latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is,
it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to
obey, under pain of the severest punishment. (46) A body politic of this
kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields
all its power as a whole. (47) The sovereign power is not restrained by any
laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of
things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all
their power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right. (48) For if
they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they ought to have taken
precautions for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so,
and indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently ruining
the state, they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign
power; and, therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as reason and
necessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign
power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies, and
will act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a
primary duty. (49) For reason bids us choose the least of two evils.
(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion
and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we
have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their will,
so long as they have the full power to enforce it: if such power be lost
their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed it
and can keep it. (51) Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose
thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own
interests, and retain their power by consulting the public good and
acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, "violenta
imperia nemo continuit diu." (52) No one can long retain a tyrant's sway.
(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for
it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be a
large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis
and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring
men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they may live in
peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin.
(16:54) Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of
subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no right
save that which it sanctions.
[16:4] (55) It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into
slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this
idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away
by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act
accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire
guidance of reason.
(16:56) Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain
sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends on the
object of the action. (57) If the object of the action be the good of the
state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does
himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole
people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the
sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a
subject. (58) Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on
sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free [Endnote
27]; that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.
(16:59) Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their
parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look generally to
the children's benefit.
(60) We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a
son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. (61) A slave is one
who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely in
the master's interest: a son is one who obeys his father's orders, given
in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power,
given for the common interest, wherein he is included.
(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a
democracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all
forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual
liberty. (63) In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he
has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of a
society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain as they were in the state
of nature, equals.
(16:64) This is the only form of government which I have treated of at
length, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of
freedom in a state.
(65) I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of
government, for we may gather from what has been said whence their right
arises without going into its origin. (66) The possessor of sovereign power,
whether he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign
right of imposing any commands he pleases: and he who has either
voluntarily, or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to
another, has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore
bound to obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will
be bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the
sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer. (67) I need
add no more.
[16:5] (68) The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall
readily be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and
injustice, with their relations to the state; and also to determine what
constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.
(16:69) By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man
possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the
sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when a man has
transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only
limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of
self-defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to
him entirely for his defence. (70) Wrong takes place when a citizen, or
subject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction
to the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.
(16:71) Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can it ever
accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to do
what he likes. (72) It can only arise, therefore, between private persons,
who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. (73) Justice
consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due: injustice
consists in depriving a man, under the pretence of legality, of what the
laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. (74) These last are also called
equity and iniquity, because those who administer the laws are bound to show
no respect of persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend every
man's right equally, neither envying the rich nor despising the poor.
[16:6](75) The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of
avoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no
hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each
retaining his independence. (76) Such a covenant is valid so long as its
basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an engagement,
or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing
good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be removed the compact thereby
becomes void: this has been abundantly shown by experience. (77) For
although different states make treaties not to harm one another, they always
take every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the
stronger party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a
sufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it.
(78) Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor would there be any
wrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and aware of the right of
the sovereign power, would trust in the promises of one who has the will and
the power to do what he likes, and who aims solely at the safety and
advantage of his dominion? (79) Moreover, if we consult loyalty and
religion, we shall see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by
his promises to the injury of his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises
without breaking the engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he
and they are most solemnly bound. (80) An enemy is one who lives apart from
the state, and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as an
ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the
state. (81) The rights of the state are the same in regard to him who
does not recognize by any compact the state authority, as they are against
him who has done the state an injury: it has the right to force him as best
it can, either to submit, or to contract an alliance.
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